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ADDING BITE TO THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT:
APPLYING KISOR TO REVITALIZE THE
YOUNGSTOWN TRIPARTITE
Zachary W. Singer*
In the half century and more since Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,1 the fog surrounding acceptable executive
power in national security and foreign affairs has only thickened. Today, whether presidents
are responding to the challenges of an amorphous global war on terrorism or a global
pandemic, they act against a backdrop of ambiguous constitutional and statutory
authorization and shifting precedent. While Justice Jackson outlined zones of presidential
power by tying that power to congressional acts, the Court subsequently watered down the test
by looking to other factors, like legislative intent. At other times, the Court appeared to jettison
the Youngstown zones for uncertain statutory analyses. Responding to the changing
precedent, some scholars and practitioners called for deference for executive actions in national
security and beyond. Others called for using the same statutory tools as in any other case.
A compromise is available. For courts seeking to remain faithful to Youngstown
while recognizing calls for executive deference, I argue that they should look toward recent
administrative law precedents. There, courts confront challenges similar to those in the
national security and foreign affairs realms—unclear statutes and regulations, an inability to
legislate with specificity, and political actors with more subject-matter expertise than the
judiciary. The two-part test outlined in Kisor v. Wilkie,2 which focuses on whether a
regulation is ambiguous and whether the character and context of the agency’s actions warrant
deference, is the available compromise. The Kisor test would not only infuse clarity into
Justice Jackson’s tripartite system, but would foster improved incentives for the political
branches, such as encouraging the executive to utilize internal and external processes deserving
of deference, while also serving as a measured restraint on the judiciary.
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INTRODUCTION
“A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive
power as they actually present themselves.”3 In the decades since Justice Jackson’s
famous concurrence, the fog surrounding the acceptable use of executive power in
national security and foreign affairs has not cleared. If anything, recent
administrations in both political parties have been accused of expanding executive
power to new bounds unsupported by the Constitution. Yet, at the onset of the
current drive toward the expansion of executive power, beginning in 2001 with the
War on Terror, some scholars opined that courts were too eager to pare back
executive action and that their statutory basis for doing so was weak.4
The subsequent two decades of executive power confusion demonstrates
that it is high time to reexamine the framework for presidential action in national
security and foreign affairs. On one side, Dames & Moore v. Regan5 weakened Justice
Jackson’s Youngstown institutional framework when it shifted the analytic balance
toward a deference regime, leaving it as an unsuitable option for those seeking
restraints on executive power. On the other, in post-9/11 precedent, embodied in
3.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634.

4.
See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs
Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT 179, 180 (2006).
5.

453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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cases like Hamdan v. Rumsfeld6 and Boumediene v. Bush,7 the Court used statutory
analysis as the primary touchstone for national security cases. Yet, this statutory
analysis of the limits of executive power exists in a landscape of vague statutory and
constitutional provisions that create uncertainty, allowing courts to be either highly
critical or highly deferential depending on the situation.
A compromise is available. This Article argues that courts should look
toward recent cases in administrative law, primarily Kisor v. Wilkie,8 for an approach
to executive power in national security and foreign affairs. Administrative law
provides an apt comparison point for three reasons. First, courts face the same
difficulties in interpreting ambiguous statutes and regulations in administrative law
as they do in national security cases. Second, agencies and the executive enjoy similar
advantages in terms of expertise over the courts in both administrative law and
national security-related disputes. Third, in both areas of law, Congress delegates to
the executive and federal agencies the power to construe statutory and regulatory
ambiguities.
The Kisor framework—which advocates for close statutory analysis coupled
with institutional process requirements—in conjunction with Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown tripartite scheme—is a compromise between strong executive deference
and curbing executive power. Such a framework would also provide clearer and more
predictable answers to the fundamental questions of how to approach the analysis
and when and how much deference the executive can claim for its actions. In doing
so, the Kisor framework would foster increased deliberation between and within the
political branches, while allowing the executive to leverage its expertise in securing
judicial deference.
This Article proceeds by first outlining the descent from Justice Jackson’s
scheme to the muddled modern precedent. Next, it discusses applying Kisor to
Youngstown and how courts can use the existing precedent within that framework.
The Article will examine an example under the proposed Kisor scheme, comparing
the result to that reached under other regimes. Lastly, the Article concludes by
weighing the benefits and drawbacks of such a scheme for today’s executive actions
in national security and foreign affairs.

I. THE YOUNGSTOWN REGIME RESCINDED
Today, two separate modes of analysis prevail in questions involving
executive authority in national security and foreign affairs. Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence outlines an institutional mode, restraining or releasing the
executive’s power in line with the degree of congressional approval or acquiescence.
The framework initially prescribed a searching analysis in which a court would

6.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).

7.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).

8.

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
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evaluate the challenged action within the overall congressional scheme related to it;
subsequent cases purportedly applying that framework, however, have loosened the
parameters and given a pass to executive action that is not in express contradiction
with congressional action. In a second mode, courts have also eschewed the
Youngstown framework in order to utilize more typical statutory analysis to resolve
questions of executive authority. At first blush, the statutory route appeared to
constrain executive action during the War on Terror, but the Court has since put it
to use buttressing expansive executive power. In sum, two frameworks exist, yet
neither offers consistent, predictable constraints on executive authority.
This section traces the Court’s change from Youngstown to its Dames &
Moore posture. Next, it describes its embrace of statutory analysis for cases of
executive action in the fields of national security and foreign affairs.

A. From Youngstown to Dames & Moore
1.

Youngstown: Tethering of the Executive

Youngstown—the opinion that courts9 and commentators10 alike have named
the pinnacle of executive power analysis—rose amidst the confusion of seven
opinions and the emergency of the Korean War. While the system that emerged from
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown opinion is easily summarized, the context in which he
wrote it is essential.
During the Youngstown case, the Court confronted the “extraordinary times”
of the Korean War, which had already resulted in over 108,000 American casualties
over its first two years.11 Facing the grave military threat posed by a nation-wide steel
mill strike, President Harry Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of most of the country’s mills to ensure their continued operation.12 The
following morning, President Truman reported his action to Congress and sent a
second message twelve days later; Congress took no action in response.13 The steel
companies, however, did act, suing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer and
arguing that the President’s seizure of the mills was neither authorized by an act of
Congress nor supported by a constitutional provision.14 Nine days after President
9.
See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (“Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite
scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 at 668 (“The parties and the lower courts . . . have all agreed that much relevant
analysis is contained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube.”).
10. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J.F. 86 (2016); Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets
Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917 (2012).
11.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).

12.

Id. at 582-83.

13.

Id. at 583.

14.

Id.
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Truman’s second message to Congress, the District Court issued a preliminary
injunction restraining the Secretary from the mill seizure; the Court of Appeals
vacated the stay the same day.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May third
with arguments scheduled in the monumental case on May twelfth.16
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Black, used a statutory approach;
it centered on whether the President’s action was authorized by the Constitution or
an act of Congress.17 In contrast, Justice Jackson’s concurrence offered a dynamic
institutional test for determining whether the President’s actions were permissible.18
The test established three zones. Zone One, afforded the most deference, would
apply when the President acted pursuant an express or implied congressional
authorization.19 Zone Two, the “Zone of Twilight,” results from absence of
congressional approval or denial, and would allow the President only their
independent powers.20 Zone Three, the lowest ebb of Presidential power, refers to
presidential action incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.21
Justice Jackson categorized President Truman’s actions as falling into Zone
Three.22 He noted that the seizure of private property was not “an open field” but
instead had been covered by three statutory schemes inconsistent with the seizure.23
Because President Truman neither invoked nor followed any of the three statutes,
Justice Jackson found that President Truman could not claim that his action should
fall within either Zone One or Zone Two—Congress had neither invited nor
explicitly condoned it.24 Instead, Justice Jackson concluded that President Truman’s
authority was incompatible with congressional action in the field because these three
congressional options existed and President Truman had used none of them.
Furthermore, because Congress had legislated in the field, President Truman could
not claim that Congress had invited his actions by failing to act itself.25 President
Truman could therefore only rely on his inherent power, which, in this instance, was
insufficient.26

15.

Id. at 584.

16.

Id.

17.

Id. at 585.

18.

Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).

19.

Id. at 635-37.

20.

Id. at 637.

21.

Id. at 637-38.

22.

Id. at 640.

23. Id. at 639. For cases where the government itself was being supplied, Justice Jackson discussed
two options. First, under the Selective Service Act of 1948, the government could seize the plant to comply
with the orders placed by the government. Second, the government could have condemned the facilities
under the power of eminent domain. Lastly, even if the government is not being supplied, it could have
cited to the Labor Management Relations Act. See id.
24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 640-41.
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Justice Jackson’s concurrence stands not only for the three zones that it
created, but also for the searching statutory analysis that must precede the test.
Jackson did not take the three statutory schemes involving the seizure of private
property as a basis for finding a broad congressional approval for permitting the
President to seize property in a different manner.27 He also did not infer
congressional approval for President Truman’s seizure from the numerous bills that
funded the Korean War, inasmuch as much of that funding was for steel purchases
to build weapons and vehicles.28 And he did not rely on the exigencies of the war or
the effect a complete steel shortage would have on the country’s ability to fight it.29
Instead, the touchstone of his analysis was his careful discernment of the permissible
bounds Congress specifically approved of and his placement of President Truman’s
actions outside of that permissible area.30

2.

Dames & Moore: Unleashing the Executive

In Dames & Moore, the Court used Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework
but eschewed his strict statutory analysis. In doing so, the case transformed the
meaning of statutory silence from disapproval of an executive action into tacit
approval.
Dames & Moore involved, among other questions, whether President Jimmy
Carter had the authority to suspend claims in American courts brought by U.S.
citizens against Iran.31 President Carter purported to act under the authority of two
pieces of legislation: the Hostage Act and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA).32 The President argued that the Hostage Act, passed in 1868,
gave him the power to suspend the claims because it allowed for presidential action
if U.S. citizens abroad were imprisoned in violation of their rights.33 Additionally,
President Carter claimed the IEEPA also provided statutory support for his actions
because it empowered the president to nullify or prohibit a transfer of property
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which a foreign country has an
interest.34 The Court, however, found that neither statute constituted specific
authorization for the President’s suspension of the claims.35 The Hostage Act faced
“several difficulties” in its application because the 1868 Act was concerned with
27. See id. at 639 (“In choosing a different and inconsistent way of his own, the President cannot
claim that it is necessitated or invited by failure of Congress to legislate upon the occasions, grounds and
methods for seizure of industrial properties.”).
28.

Cf. id. at 671-72 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).

29.

Cf. id.

30.

See id. at 638-40.

31.

453 U.S. at 675.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. at 676.

34.

See id. at 669-71.

35.

Id. at 677.
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“countries refusing to recognize the citizenship of naturalized Americans,” whereas
in this case, the American hostages “were seized precisely because of their American
citizenship.”36 Moreover, the Court held that the “terms of the IEEPA [] do not
authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts” because the statute
only empowers the President to nullify attachments to property and order the
transfer of assets.37 Despite neither statute approving of the President’s actions, the
Court nonetheless found that both were relevant “in the looser sense of indicating
congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action.”38 The Court
suggested that it could not “ignore the general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this
area” because the statutes granted the President some discretion.39 The majority
noted that Congress had implicitly approved of such a practice through the
enactment of its 1949 Claims Settlement Act and the legislative history of the
IEEPA, which stressed that the Act did not interfere with a president’s ability to
block assets or impede claims settlements between U.S. citizens and foreign
countries.40
Dames & Moore adopted a more deferential posture toward executive
authority than Youngstown,41 the precedent it was purportedly applying.42 While
Youngstown had rejected the notion that statutes allowing executive seizures in other
contexts implicitly authorized President Truman’s seizure of the mills, Dames &
Moore did the opposite, holding that legislation related to similar presidential powers
created a congressional “tenor” which allowed President Carter to do as he willed.43
The Court in Dames & Moore found clear statutory acquiescence for the President’s
action despite, “at best,” an ambiguous statutory basis for it.44 In doing so, the Court
outlined a permissive analysis much more deferential to the executive.

36.

Id. at 676-77.

37.

Id. at 675.

38.

Id. at 677.

39.

Id. at 678.

40.

Id. at 680-82.

41. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1310-11 (1988). Professor Koh discusses that Dames & Moore
“dramatically alters the application of Youngstown’s constitutional analysis in foreign affairs cases.” Id. In
sum, under Dames & Moore, a court may find congressional inaction or legislation in a related field as
implicit approval for executive action. Id. at 1311. The dramatic effect of this ruling is realized when put
in concert with the Court’s later Chadha holding which only allows for congressional disapproval of
executive action by passing a joint resolution in both houses by a supermajority capable of overcoming a
presidential veto. Thus, the two rulings together create a “one-way ‘ratchet effect’ that effectively redraws
the categories described in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.” Id.
42.

See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668.

43. See Koh, supra note 41, at 1311 (discussing how Dames & Moore “radically undercuts
Youngstown’s vision” because courts may “treat[] all manner of ambiguous congressional action as ‘approval’
for a challenged presidential act”).
44. Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers after
Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 948 (2007).

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

390

Vol. 10:2

B. Post-9/11 Cases: The Rise of Marbury Analysis
Despite the permissive framework put forward by Dames & Moore, after
9/11, the Court tacked in a new direction. In 2001, Congress enacted two principal
statutes of the War on Terror: the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF)45 and the Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (PATRIOT Act).46 These laws were largely silent on subsequent
actions from the Bush Administration, like the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants; the detention and trial by military commission of non-citizen enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay; the use of secret overseas prisons; and the
enactment of domestic surveillance measures.47 The Bush Administration maintained
that despite the statutes’ silence on the aforementioned actions, their broad grant of
powers lent support, or, in the terms of Dames & Moore, created a “general tenor,” to
buttress the aggressive programs.48 Cases were swiftly brought to challenge President
Bush’s actions to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants and the use of military
commissions for non-citizen enemy combatants. However, in the face of ambiguous
statutes, the Court did not rely on the Youngstown framework, as amended by Dames
& Moore. Instead, it pursued a statutory analysis. An examination of a handful of
cases brings this shift to light.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,49 a plurality opinion written by Justice O’Connor,
the Court held that the President maintained the power to indefinitely detain a U.S.
citizen seized in Afghanistan because of the AUMF.50 The Court found that the
AUMF gave the President the ability to make battlefield captures because embedded
in the ability to use force was the power to detain.51 The key takeaway of the case
was that the Court relied on statutory analysis in a manner inconsistent with
Youngstown and Dames & Moore, analyzing the AUMF as encompassing detention
power, rather than analyzing the congressional approval in relation to the three
zones.52 For example, the plurality opinion could have supported its stance by
evaluating the statutory field to determine whether Congress had already covered
the space, in the analysis of Youngstown, or acquiesced to the presidential action, in
the analysis of Dames & Moore. Justice Thomas’s dissent outlined how the Court
could have used the permissive analysis of Dames & Moore to uphold the President’s
actions irrespective of close statutory analysis.53 In his opinion, he cited to that case
for the proposition that the President was acting pursuant to broad congressional
45.

Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).

46.

Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

47.

Vladeck, supra note 44, at 950.

48.

Id. at 950-51; see also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678.

49.

542 U.S. 507 (2004).

50.

Id. at 518 (plurality opinion).

51.

Id.

52.

Landau, supra note 10, at 1952.

53.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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powers provided to the executive.54 Additionally, Justice Thomas’ analysis suggested
that courts should not set aside executive action during the time of war and public
danger unless there is clear conviction that the action is in conflict with the
Constitution or laws of Congress.55
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld addressed the President’s authority to create military
commissions to try enemy combatants captured during the invasion of Afghanistan.
The President defended his use of the commissions as authorized by the AUMF, the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), and the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ).56 The government argued that Congress authorized the use of military
commissions in the AUMF because it gave the president the authority to deter and
prevent acts of international terrorism and gave the president the ability “to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks…”57
Additionally, the government argued that the DTA “expressly recognized” and
ratified the practice of military tribunals.58 Lastly, the government looked to the
UCMJ as granting the president the power to use military commissions when he
deems necessary.59 The Court disagreed, holding that absent a clear statutory
authorization, the commissions could not continue.60
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy cited to Justice Jackson’s tripartite
scheme as the “proper framework for assessing whether executive actions are
authorized.”61 He noted that the President “acted in a field with a history of
congressional participation and regulation.”62 The UCMJ, for example, provides
authority for certain forms of military courts, but it “also imposes limitations.”63
Thus, while the laws provided some authority for military courts, they imposed
limitations—such as the proscribed structure and composition in the court-martial
standards.64 Because the President did not follow these standards, and, in fact,
exceeded their limits, he could not rely on the UCMJ.65 Justice Thomas’s dissent,
however, demonstrated how the majority’s opinion differed from the Dames & Moore
approach. Thomas quoted Dames & Moore for the proposition that “[t]he enactment
54. Id. at 583 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (Jackson, J., concurring)) (“As far as the
courts are concerned, ‘the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may
be considered to ‘invite’ measures on independent presidential responsibility.’ ”).
55.

Id. at 584.

56.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593-94 (2006).

57.

Brief for the Government at 16, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184).

58.

Id. at 15.

59.

Id. at 17-18.

60.

Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594-95.

61.

Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

62.

Id. at 639 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 619-20).

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 647.

65.

Id. at 653.
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of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority in a particular
case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be
considered to invite measures on independent presidential responsibility.”66 Justice
Thomas, therefore, noted that under Dames & Moore, the President’s decision to use
military commissions deserved a “heavy measure of deference” given congressional
approval by the AUMF.67
These two colossal cases68 demonstrate the Court’s departure from the
Dames & Moore deference regime. In its place, the Court adopted a close statutory
analysis as the hallmark for approaching executive authority in national security and
foreign affairs. This close statutory analysis, which reserves a judicial role completely
independent that of the executive’s view—a Marbury approach,69 caused scholars at
the time to believe the Court had abandoned the idea of executive deference in these
fields.70
Yet, with time, it has become clearer that the Court’s shift was not per se
anti-executive power in these fields. Instead, the statutory analysis may allow for
strong deference depending on how it is used. For example, in Trump v. Hawaii,71 a
case involving the President’s authority to halt entry of immigrants for national
security purposes from eight countries (six of which were Muslim-majority), the
Court found that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “exudes deference to
the President in every clause.”72 It is certainly far from certain that the INA, in fact,
exudes deference throughout.73 Additionally, irrespective of—although likely related
66.

Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678).

67.

Id.

68. These two cases, however, are not alone in exemplifying the Court’s shift toward statutory
analysis primacy. For example, in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), foreign detainees petitioned
for writs of habeas corpus despite the government arguing that the Military Commissions Act denied
federal courts jurisdiction to hear their cases. The Court struck down a provision of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which attempted to remove jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo Boy
detainees’ habeas petitions, as unconstitutional; the Court rejected the executive’s arguments that the
canon of constitutional avoidance, coupled with deference to the executive’s interpretation, could be used
to avoid a constitutional holding against the executive. Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing
the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 805-06 (2011). To that end, Justice
Scalia in his dissent argued that the Court exhibited no deference to the political branches in its analysis.
Id. at 806 n.118 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 830 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In sum, in a series of cases
involving executive action in national security and foreign affairs, the Court largely dismissed arguments
that the executive should receive deference on its interpretations of these statutes; instead, it used statutory
analysis to discern executive power absent claims of deference in the space. Id. at 784-86.
69. See, e.g., id. at 785 (“In treaty interpretation, the Court has invoked a Marbury-based insistence
on asserting its own formal interpretative authority.”).
70. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 180; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1204 (2007).
71.

138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

72.

Id. at 2408.

73. See Brief of Professors of Federal Courts Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, and Immigration
Law as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (discussing that even using
Dames & Moore as a comparison, the President’s action failed because it lacked statutory basis and lacked
a “stamp of approval” from Congress). To that end, there was no history of congressional acquiescence
because in the 43 instances that a president invoked § 1182(f) to suspend entry of noncitizens, on no
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to—this shift in use of statutory analysis, the Court has also found areas of national
security and foreign affairs that the executive maintains exclusive control over.74
From both a political and jurisprudence perspective, now is the time to
address the Court’s jurisprudence of executive action in national security and foreign
affairs. Politically, both Democrats and Republicans have recently experienced
presidents of the opposite political party wielding what they believed to be an overvast executive authority.75 From a jurisprudential standpoint, on the one hand, the
Youngstown framework as amended by Dames & Moore can be construed as permissive
of executive authority in these fields. On the other hand, the immediate post 9/11
cases have demonstrated a type of statutory, Marbury approach—an approach that
first appeared critical of executive authority outpacing congressional approval, but
does not necessitate this outcome. Therefore, a framework that can balance
constitutional and functional necessities would help provide greater predictability
and incentives for the political branches.

II. KISOR FOR THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT
To develop a more robust framework for executive authority, the Court can
look toward its recent holdings in administrative law. In administrative law, the
Court’s opinions have responded to the institutional and constitutional challenges
regarding agency actions in the modern administrative state. In Kisor v. Wilkie,76 the
Court addressed the deference afforded to agency interpretations of their own
regulations (Auer77 deference). The Court outlined a test affording deference only to
regulations that are truly ambiguous, where the “character and context of the agency
occasion had the president used nationality alone to bar entry into the United States. Id. at 13. Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent, among other areas, discussed the majority’s departure from even a permissive Dames
& Moore type of analysis. See 138 S. Ct. at 2444 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Put simply, Congress has
already erected a statutory scheme that fulfills the putative national-security interests the Government
now puts forth to justify the Proclamation.”).
74. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 12-14 (2015). The Court in Zivotofsky used the Youngstown
framework to analyze whether the President could ignore Congress’s attempt to require the State
Department to mark in passports that Jerusalem is part of Israel. Despite finding that the President’s
action in refusing to implement Congress’s statute put the action within Youngstown’s lowest ebb, the
Court nonetheless held that the Constitution’s text, structure, and function grants exclusive recognition
power to the President. Id. at 2084, 2086. Elsewhere, the Executive has expanded upon the use of
executive agreements in lieu of treaties, sidestepping the Senate’s role in ratifying them. Despite the
growth in executive agreements, the Court has never invalidated an executive agreement for undermining
the Senate’s constitutional role in ratifying treaties. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 388 (5th ed. 2015).
75. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Presidential Power Must Be Curbed After Trump, Candidates Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/us/politics/executive-power-survey2020.html; Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama Has Come
to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/us/politics/obama-eralegacy-regulation.html.
76.

139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415-16 (2019).

77.

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”78 These preconditions are similar to
the Court’s approach to Chevron deference for agency interpretations of statutes.79 A
similar test to examine whether executive action exists within Justice Jackson’s Zone
Two or Zone Three would help bring predictability to cases governing the scope of
executive authority. Courts reviewing these types of executive actions are in a similar
position to courts interpreting agency action given the expertise of agencies and the
executive in their respective fields and the choice Congress often makes to legislate
in the general rather than the specific mode, making a similar test a natural option.
This section begins by expanding upon the parallels between administrative
law and executive power in these fields. Next, it describes the previous scholarship
linking the two areas of law. Lastly, it outlines what applying Kisor to executive power
in national security and foreign affairs would and the potential benefits and
detractions of moving to such a framework.

A. Parallels Between Administrative Law and Executive Power
Courts reviewing agency interpretations of regulations and executive
actions in national security and foreign affairs face numerous parallel constraints and
incentives. These parallels result from the expertise of agencies and the executive in
their respective fields, the reality that Congress and agencies generally do not
legislate or regulate with specificity in advance, and the similar incentives facing the
political branches that arise in both areas. These conceptual underpinnings are often
the basis for the calls for deference to these actors’ decisions.
Executive interpretations of national security and foreign affairs laws reflect
similar levels of expertise in their field to agencies interpreting relevant statutes and
regulations.80 In administrative law, there is a “well-reasoned view [that] the agencies
implementing a statute [have] a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”81 Given their experience in
78.

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415-16.

79. See id. at 2416 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001), which requires
“an analogous though not identical inquiry for Chevron deference”).
80. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (“More fundamentally, plaintiffs and the dissent
challenge the entry suspension based on their perception of its effectiveness and wisdom. They suggest
that the policy is overbroad and does little to serve national security interests. But we cannot substitute
our own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters, all of which ‘are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’ ”) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 US. 103, 111 (1948)).
81. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also
Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 202 (discussing agencies with greater expertise over complex and technical
statutes); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1176 (noting that Chevron applies in areas of administrative
expertise). But see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I., 65 STAN L. REV. 901, 1004
(2013). Expertise may not equate with Congress delegating authority to resolve important questions of
policy. For example, Congress may assume, and delegate, agencies the ability to resolve ambiguity
regarding routine matters but believe that major questions were not delegated; although if an agency has
technical expertise, Congress may be more inclined to delegate these so called “major questions.” Id.
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their respective subject areas, agencies are presumed to be better positioned to resolve
statutory and regulatory ambiguities than are their judicial counterparts.82 Similarly,
the executive is presumed to maintain expertise and experience in the fields of
national security and foreign affairs.83 This relative expertise vis-à-vis Congress and
the courts arises from the functional aspects of being able to work in secret, monitor
developments in foreign affairs and national security, and act quickly and decisively
when needed.84 Additionally, the executive has the benefit of the experience of their
sizeable national security and foreign affairs apparatus, which dwarfs the size and
scope of the other branches’ capabilities.
Moreover, Congress and agencies face difficulty acting in advance with
specificity in both administrative law and areas relating to national security matters
and foreign affairs. Legislating in both areas requires building flexibility into
governing statutes to ensure they operate amid changing circumstances.85 Proponents
argue that in the face of statutory ambiguity, agencies and the executive are in the
best position to make the policy-implementing decisions.86 Courts are often hesitant

82.

See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1176.

83. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 14 (discussing that the President maintains exclusive power of
recognizing foreign nations as the country must have a single policy in the area); Posner & Sunstein, supra
note 70, at 1176 ("[R]esolving ambiguities requires judgments of policy and principle, and the foreign
policy expertise of the executive places it in the best position to make those judgments"); Ku & Yoo, supra
note 4, at 202 (“In the area of foreign policy, the executive branch is composed of large bureaucracies
solely focused on designing and implementing foreign policy.”). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Structural
Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 887, 917-18 (2012). Huq analyzes the internal
construction of the branches of government to note that the attributes given to these branches, such as
“executive speed” or “congressional deliberation” rest on weak structural assumptions about the branches
and are not borne out by empirical research. Id. at 904-05.
84. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1202 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 320 (1936)). Of course, speed may be an irrelevant factor when courts review executive
action in the months and years that follow because courts are not under time pressure to respond to an
emergency that has likely subsided. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1252 (2007). However, anticipation of subsequent litigation may incentivize the
executive to speedily address an issue, which may or may not be beneficial. See id. at 1252 n.82.
85. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting that Chevron allows for statutory
“ambiguity (and hence flexibility)” to be resolved by the agencies); see also Landau, supra note 10, at 1930
(quoting Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 676-78 (2000))
(discussing that a benefit of statutory ambiguity in the foreign affairs context is that it allows for
“[c]hanging world conditions and the executive branch’s unique access to foreign affairs information”).
86. Hamdi exemplifies this idea of an executive receiving the leeway to work within a vague
statutory basis. The plurality found that the AUMF, which is quite vague on its face, granted the power
to detain a US citizen despite the Non-Detention Act’s prohibition of detaining a US citizen without
congressional approval. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1220. Thus, despite the dissenters pointing
out that the AUMF was “simply too vague to provide the kind of clear authorization required by the NonDetention Act for detention,” the plurality reasoned that the detention power was a necessary implication
in the power to use force. Id. at 1220-21 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 547-48 (Souter, J., concurring)). The
Court allowed the executive to utilize the vague terms of the AUMF to wage the war as it saw fit. Posner
and Sunstein noted that even “[i]f the AUMF was ambiguous, the executive should have had the discretion
to interpret it in a reasonable fashion.” Id. at 1221.
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to interfere with agency or executive action because doing so could be viewed as
interfering with legitimate policy choices.87

B. Previous Chevron for National Security and Foreign Affairs Arguments
Reacting to these parallels and the exigencies of the time following 9/11,
some scholars began advocating for the application of Chevron deference to executive
action.88 Critics pushed back on the idea, noting the risk of executive overreach.89
From these debates, some advocated for institutional process checks on executive
action to help ensure that Congress maintained a role in these fields.90
Following the 9/11 and subsequent U.S. military attacks, some scholars
advocated for greater deference to executive action in the areas of national security
and foreign affairs.91 With regard to the AUMF, Professor Cass Sunstein noted that
the president should enjoy discretion in interpreting the ambiguities within it,
subject to a reasonableness constraint.92 Sunstein cabined his argument by concluding
with a “major qualification” that executive interpretations be constrained by the
principle that Congress must have explicitly deliberated the question at hand and
delegated discretion; still, he hedged, writing that “if national security is genuinely
at risk, clear congressional authorization will almost certainly be forthcoming.”93
The proponents of Chevron in these areas argued that its expansion was
warranted for several reasons. Some found that it was a helpful “framework for
understanding and controlling deference in what is an otherwise very amorphous
area.”94 Others argued that a focus on delegation of authority highlights when the
executive is acting under such authority or is instead using independent lawmaking
power.95 For some, Chevron offered ‘deference with constraint,’ because to enjoy
87/ The argument that courts should leave space for agency policy expertise in the face of
ambiguous statutes is at the core of Chevron deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). Similarly, statutory parameters coupled by perceived
executive expertise in national security and foreign affairs would similarly lend itself to arguments that
courts should not undo the policies and principles chosen by the executive. See Bradley, supra note 85, at
673.
88.

See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70.

89.

See, e.g., Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1230.

90.

Id. at 1279-80.

91. E.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1173 (“Our more ambitious goal is to suggest that
courts should generally draw on established principles of administrative law to permit executive
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international relations doctrine.”).
92.

Cass Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2664 (2005).

93.

Id. at 2672.

94. Bradley, supra note 85, at 674. Notably, scholars in favor of a strong Chevron for executive
action would replace Justice Jackson’s searching statutory analysis with a deference regime that may even
exceed the Dames & Moore approach to searching for congressional approval through enactment of similar
statutes in the area. That said, some scholars have found that the existing Dames & Moore gloss on Justice
Jackson’s Zone Two already represents a deference regime in favor of the President. E. Garrett West, A
Youngstown for the Administrative State, 70 ADMINISTRATIVE L. REV. 629, 646 (2018).
95.

Bradley, supra note 85, at 674.
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deference, the meaning of the law under which the executive acts must be ambiguous,
and Congress must have delegated power to the executive.96 In comparison, others
believed Chevron should be applied by courts reviewing executive action because
Chevron would allow the executive greater discretion in its areas of operative
expertise.97 To that end, some Chevron proponents argued that courts reviewing the
executive’s use of military force should use a “super-strong deference” stemming
from both Chevron and the president’s constitutional responsibilities as commander
in chief.98
Critics pushed back on many of the Chevron proponents’ assumptions and
conclusions. For example, some noted that Professors Sunstein and Eric Posner
centered too much of the debate comparing the executive to the judiciary; instead,
these critics contended, it was Congress’s constitutional and institutional functions
that were at issue.99 Therefore, Professors Derek Jinks and Neal Kumar Katyal
advocated against an adoption of a strong Chevron deference in foreign affairs matters
because current law allows Congress to correct courts when they limit the executive’s
authority.100 Other critics found it unusual for scholars to propose the use of Chevron
at a time when its doctrinal stability was in question.101
Similarly, critics noted that Chevron was a “blunt tool for ensuring
expertise” because under such a regime, the President would enjoy deference from
the courts even if those with relevant capabilities were not involved in the decisionmaking process.102 Katyal and Jinks proposed that prior to awarding Chevron
deference to the president, processes should be implemented within the executive
branch to ensure that experts were contributing to the decisions being litigated.103
Thus, for Katyal and Jinks, courts would benefit from implementing Chevron

96.

Id. at 674-75.

97.

Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 201-02.

98.

Id. at 196 (quoting Sunstein, supra note 92, at 2671).

99.

Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1252.

100. Id. at 1253.
101. See Pearlstein, supra note 68, at 787.
102. Id. If courts wanted to control against this criticism while still maintaining a Chevron deference
regime, they could look toward Mead and other Chevron Step Zero cases. For example, Mead tied the
agency’s formal process and expertise to the determination of whether or not it could receive Chevron
deference. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1248. As explained further in Subsection Section C, infra, one
could import a similar test from Kisor to assuage this concern about the executive using its expertise.
103. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1280 (“To be sure, the President has a State Department,
a Defense Department . . . but each of these entities can be cut out under streamlined presidential decisionmaking. One way of viewing our point is to say that when Congress is ‘delegating’ interpretive power to
the President, it is doing so under the assumption that the President will use existing channels and
procedures. If the President truncates them, however, the arguments in favor of Chevron deference are
weakened significantly.”); see also Pearlstein, supra note 68, at 819 (“If one accepts the view that the
executive’s key strength is its expertise . . . one would presumably wish to insist that the actual experts
inside the executive branch be consulted.”).
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deference in non-emergencies only when the executive used standard inter-agency
processes.104
Ultimately, some scholars found that the Chevron proponents and detractors
were both off-base, as cases in national security and foreign affairs demonstrated that
the Court tailored its deference depending on institutional considerations. For
example, Professor Joseph Landau described that the national security cases were
similar to their Chevron administrative law counterparts where the Court would defer
to policies resulting from joint political branch decision-making while maintaining
skepticism toward policies lacking statutory foundation.105 Landau argued that the
Court must not allow Chevron to displace Congress’ participation in the lawmaking
process.106 To that end, courts, instead of embracing a fully deferential regime, could,
as they have done in the past, calibrate their own role and adjudications to the actions
of political branches: where both branches have endorsed an action, courts could and
should accept their judgments.107
The debate surrounding the post-9/11 executive authority cases pitted those
seeking Chevron deference for executive authority against those believing that the
courts should maintain their fidelity to Marbury statutory analysis, with some calling
for chartering a middle ground relying on institutional considerations.108 Over time,
scholarly support arguing for Chevron deference to presidential actions in national
security and foreign affairs dissipated as the exigencies of 9/11 faded and Chevron was
increasingly questioned within administrative law scholarship.109

C. Kisor for Youngstown
Today, administrative law principles address many of the concerns held by
the Chevron critics while satisfying many of the institutional factors identified by
those seeking to apply Chevron to presidential action. Resurrecting the principles
from Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence would not only constitute a
compromise between deference and Marbury analyses but also allow courts to craft
104. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1280. The inter-agency processes refer to the systematic
process of coordination across the executive department. This process stems from the National Security
Act of 1947, which created the National Security Council, a new organization aimed at improving the
integration of national security strategy. The National Security Council, amongst other things, collects
information, identifies policy options, and, ultimately, ensures that the President has all the necessary
information to make decisions. See Lieutenant Colonel John E. O’Neil IV, The Interagency Process —
Analysis and Reform Recommendations, U.S. Army War College Research Project, 4 (2006).
105. Landau, supra note 10, at 1971.
106. Id. at 1977.
107. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 1, 44
(2004). Thus, under this account, the courts have “tied their own role to that of the more political
branches” trusting that bilateral institutional action checked executive excess sufficiently during times of
crisis. Id.
108. Landau, supra note 10, at 1977.
109. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 68, at 787.
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institutional, predictable compromises that rely on coordination between the political
branches.
This section proceeds by first describing how Kisor applies to questions of
deference to agency interpretations of their statutes. Next, it advocates for crafting
a similar two-part test from Justice Jackson’s Youngstown tripartite framework. Lastly,
it applies this test to an example and compares that analysis and outcome to those of
Youngstown, Dames & Moore, and strict Marbury statutory processes.

1.

Kisor for Agency Action

Auer deference instructs courts to give an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation controlling weight unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.110 Just as with Chevron, Auer deference is rooted in
a presumption about congressional intent.111 The idea is that Congress would want
the agency to “play the primary role” in resolving regulatory ambiguities.112
In Kisor, the Court clarified when courts should afford Auer deference to
agency decisions. The Court noted that Auer deference “is not the answer to every
question of interpreting an agency’s rules.”113 Instead, the Court created a twopronged test. First, the possibility of deference arises only if a regulation “is
genuinely ambiguous” after a court “resorted to all the standard tools of
interpretation.”114 Next, not all reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous
regulations will receive the presumption of deference. The Court noted that “when
the reasons for that presumption do not apply, or countervailing reasons outweigh
them, courts should not give deference to an agency’s reading, except to the extent it
has the ‘power to persuade.’ ”115 A court, therefore, “must make an independent
inquiry into whether the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles
it to controlling weight.”116 Factors for this inquiry include whether it is the agency’s
authoritative or official position.117 Additionally, the interpretation must have relied
on the agency’s substantive expertise and reflect its “fair and considered
judgment.”118
110. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105 (2018) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
111. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412.
112. Id. Critics of the doctrine note that lodging law-making and law-executing powers within the
same actor violates separation of powers principles. In addition to these separation of powers concerns,
critics discuss that Auer deference institutes perverse incentives for agencies to promulgate vague
regulations to give themselves additional power to interpret them. Walker, supra note 110, at 105-06.
113. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 159 (2012)).
116. Id. at 2416 (citing Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155).
117. Id. (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 257-59).
118. Id. at 2417 (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155). Justice Gorsuch was not convinced that these
factors secure Auer deference from constitutional infirmities. He notes that the granting of deference to
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Kisor for Executive Action

Integrating Kisor and Youngstown could help delineate the boundary
between Zones Two and Three and the corresponding deference owed to a particular
executive action.119 Confusion over the zone in which executive action lies typically
arises when the statutory basis for the executive’s action is unclear, yet Congress
could be viewed as acquiescing to the executive’s authority in the area.120 Kisor would
help to navigate this conundrum.
The first step of Kisor fits with Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, as
both advocate for close statutory analysis. Justice Jackson scrutinized the statutory
landscape to determine whether President Truman’s mill seizure fell within an
express congressional grant of authority.121 He found that, while Congress had
provided various measures through which the executive could seize property,
President Truman’s takeover had failed to adhere to any of the available
Congressionally-approved schemes, knocking the president out of Zones One and
Two and into Zone Three.122 Kisor’s first step—applying statutory analysis to agency
action—would, in the context of presidential power, constitute an explicit return to
Justice Jackson’s searching approach.123 In both Kisor and Youngstown, a court
evaluates the statutory basis for a decision by examining the statute or regulatory
basis for the decision, as well as the statutory or regulatory scheme.
Kisor’s first step calls for an exhaustion of “all the ‘traditional tools’ of
construction.”124 By searching text, structure, and history, courts can discern whether
Congress has explicitly spoken on the issue in question. Kisor’s rigorous searching
stands in contrast to the approach courts have taken under both Dames & Moore and
Marbury analyses of executive action. On one end, Kisor rejects Dames & Moore’s
permissive statutory analysis. There, the Court not only ignored the legislative
history that evinced congressional intent to reign in presidential power, but it also
used lack of express congressional disapproval of the President’s actions and the
administrative agencies’ interpretations improperly usurps judicial power by “requiring an Article III
judge to decide case before him according to principles that he believes do not accurately reflect the law.”
Id. at 2440 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). This criticism, that the deference regime violates
judicial power as articulated in Marbury, is the same criticism lodged against Chevron in the executive
action.
119. Under Justice Jackson’s original formulation this boundary policing was less of an issue;
however, as explained in Part I, the Dames & Moore gloss on the formation significantly muddied the water
by using “the general tenor of Congress’ legislation” to indicate that Congress has acquiesced to a
presidential power in a certain area. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678.
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Congress has not left seizure of
private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this
seizure.”).
122. Id.
123. Cf. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (discussing the “general tenor” of Congress’ legislation to
determine whether the President acted alone or with the acceptance of Congress).
124. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.9).
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existence of related legislation as signs of congressional approval.125 Courts
employing traditional statutory construction would be unlikely to find Congressional
authorization for agency action solely in a lack of express disapproval of an agency
taking such an action. On the other end, traditional tools of construction within this
analysis, unlike some of the Court’s Marbury mode, admit a limit. A Kisor approach
would caution against finding explicit congressional approval for overweening
executive action in statutes which never addressed the actions in question—the
methodology of the Hamdi plurality.126 Applied to the president, Kisor step one
would force courts to examine the actual statutory basis for the executive action. In
situations where using tools of statutory interpretation rendered a result, that reading
would control and dictate whether the executive’s action was permissible. For other
cases where a result was ambiguous, the analysis would continue to step two to
determine what level of deference, if any, was warranted.
Under Kisor step two, courts need to determine whether the character and
context of the executive’s action warrant defense. To that end, courts investigate
whether a) the agency’s action was made by the agency, b) whether that action
implicates the agency’s substantive expertise, and c) whether it reflects a fair and
considered judgment.127 The Kisor Court examined these factors to discern whether
the presumption that Congress would want courts to defer to agencies is true for the
given agency’s interpretation.128 A similar rationale would apply when looking into
the character and context of the president’s actions to determine whether they
deserve some deference—Zone Two’s “twilight”—or none—Zone Three’s “lowest
ebb.” A president acting in the face of “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence” may have been invited by Congress to act, so courts must “depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables”129 to understand the
nature of the dialogue between the executive and Congress in matters of national
security and the essence of the executive’s action.
Therefore, to determine whether a presidential action in the face of
legislative ambiguity deserves deference, a court should examine how the executive
conducted the decision-making process.130 A court should examine the external
125. Koh, supra note 41, at 1310.
126. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. The Court used the AUMF’s language that the President may
“use ‘all necessary and appropriate force’ against ‘nations, organizations, or persons’ associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.” From this text, the opinion makes a few leaps. By finding that the
Taliban supported al Qaeda terrorists, the Court concluded that indefinite detention of members of the
Taliban at Guantanamo Bay for the duration of conflict was congressionally authorized. Id. In dissent,
using textual analysis, including the canon of constitutional avoidance, Justice Scalia notes that the
AUMF’s text cannot be read to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or even detain citizens. Id. at 574-75
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416-18.
128. Id. at 2416.
129. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
130. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between Internal and External Separation
of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 442-44 (2009) (discussing that there is a “critical interdependent
relationship between internal and external separation of powers” and that, among other things, “external

402

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:2

factors—such as whether the president notified and adequately explained the actions’
legal grounding and policy rationales to congressional leaders—to ensure Congress
has adequate information to check the executive’s action. Given the difficulty
Congress may face in responding in these fields,131 a court should also examine the
internal factors—primarily whether the requisite experts within the administration
participated in the decision, and whether the process allowed for adequate debate and
disagreement amongst those experts.132 These factors would help to illuminate
whether a president had well-enough informed the Congress to call a subsequent
silence ‘legislative acquiescence,’ and whether the executive had relied on the
expertise that is the basis for affording their actions deference.
In order to discern the context and character of a presidential action, the
first place a court could look would be to the steps the administration took to assure
Congress maintained the requisite knowledge and ability to respond to the action.133
For example, for actions with a questionable statutory basis, the president could
mechanisms can reinforce internal constraints”). As explained further in this section, an analysis that
investigates both internal and external features of the executive’s decision seeks to not only facilitate the
functional benefits associated with fostering inter- and intra-branch checks and balances, but also ground
the analysis in Justice Jackson’s original framework. While courts do not explicitly link the external and
internal factors as a manner of fostering separation of powers, they are present in recent cases in the field.
See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). There,
then-Judge Kavanaugh discusses multi-member independent agencies’ benefits of “divid[ing] and
dispers[ing] power across multiple commissioners or board members. The multi-member structure
thereby reduces the risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and helps protect liberty.” Id. at
165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In examining the internal executive structures, then-Judge Kavanaugh
demonstrates the connection between these structures and the larger separation of powers between
branches that aim to promote the same aims he cites. Another example of courts looking at the connection
of internal and external processes is Mead. In Mead, the Court looked toward factors such as whether
Congress delegated rulemaking or adjudication powers to the agency and whether the agency ultimately
used these powers. 533 U.S. at 230-31. Thus, while not explicit, the Court diminished the fear of
impermissible delegation and expansive agency power by looking at the actions, and interactions, of the
two political branches.
131. See Metzger, supra note 130, at 437 (highlighting that “[r]eal limitations exist on the ability of
traditional external constraints, specifically Congress and the courts, to check the power of the Executive
Branch” because Congress faces the “arduous process of bicameralism and presentment and the additional
obstacles created by the operation of congressional committees and rules” and “the frequent need to
overcome a presidential veto”).
132. Related to these internal questions is to what extent must the Executive facilitate and encourage
debate to reach an outcome compared to just receiving information from the experts. While the line
drawing between these two manners is difficult, in order to uphold the idea that the executive is using its
expertise in a manner Congress would expect, courts should demand that the executive take steps to foster
and incorporate debate. In fact, this demand is in line with the Court’s decision in Hamdan. The Court
was likely concerned there with that the President’s actions with regard to the rights of detainees under
international law were not in line with the executive’s experts in the fields, such as the Judge Advocate
General and State Department. Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive
Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 695 (2009).
133. A question even preceding this initial one could look at the character of the executive action
itself. For example, it could examine how much it falls within the prerogative of one branch or the other.
For most of these questions, the actions will likely exist somewhere within Justice Jackson’s “Zone of
Twilight” where both branches have concurrent authority over some subsection of the area. That said, if
this is not the case, and one branch has clearly stepped into the constitutional function of another, a court
could certainly make the determination on this factor alone.
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request and share with senior congressional leaders an opinion from the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) outlining the legality of the action.134 The sharing of these
memos would allow Congress, or at least its leaders, to understand the legal and
factual basis for an executive’s policy choice, and understanding the rationales for the
executive’s decision could give Congress the ability to intervene with new
legislation.135 Additionally, if Congress failed to act, the failure would help to point
up its acquiescence, pushing the presidential action into Zone Two and affording it
some deference.136 Other actions, such as meetings with congressional leaders or
frequent detailed updates on the action, would go towards the same end.
A court should also look beyond these limited processes. Focusing solely on
external checks ignores that in many instances Congress has delegated some of these
decisions to the executive by not intervening in the policy area over time.137
Incorporating this idea into the analysis fully connects it with administrative law
principles.138 Thus, courts can examine whether the president engaged in adequate
internal deliberation to merit deference under Zone Two.139

134. Currently, OLC memos are not shared with members of Congress. Instead, Congress must
request and haggle with the Executive to read them. Additionally, the public only gains access to OLC
opinions when they are released voluntarily or by a Freedom of Information Act request. Billy Easley &
Sean Vitka, The Attorney General’s Secret Law Factory, MORNING CONSULT (July 3, 2019),
https://morningconsult.com/opinions/olc-opinions-attorney-general-secret-law-factory/.
135. The effects of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) loom large over this analysis. First, the
precedent limits Congress because Congress may only signal a disapproval of presidential action through
the formal mechanism of bicameralism and presentment by passing of legislation and likely overcoming a
presidential veto. Id. at 944-51; see also Koh, supra note 41, at 1311. Next, given this is the case, one may
question applying Kisor to look for congressional approval or disapproval outside of the formal mechanism
of bicameralism and presentment. However, given that this analysis calls for the examination of the
executive’s actions in relation to Congress, it at least sidesteps some of this criticism. That said, this Chadha
concern signals that courts may put emphasis on the internal deliberation aspects of the analysis.
136. This analysis is incredibly similar to what Justice Jackson rejected in his Youngstown
concurrence. There, President Truman was quite transparent with Congress as to his plan and rationale
for taking possession of the steel mills. In fact, he notified Congress the day following the seizure and sent
a second message twelve days later. Both times, Congress took no action. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.
Yet, Justice Jackson did not take this under consideration, but instead found that Congress had dictated
what was permissible when it enacted separate legislation in the area. See id. at 639. Applying Kisor in this
manner would demonstrate a relaxation of Justice Jackson’s scheme. That said, it still reflects an additional
hurdle compared to the permissiveness outlined in Dames & Moore allowing courts to read congressional
inaction or related legislation as implicit approval of executive action. 453 U.S. at 681-88.
137. See Sunstein, supra note 92, at 2666. In one manner, this implicit delegation is in conflict with
Justice Jackson’s attempt to police the boundaries of executive action by looking for explicit congressional
approval. Yet, his Zone Two does acknowledge that there are some areas of overlapping constitutional
power that the Congress allows the President to exercise, albeit through implicit manners of acquiescence.
138. Id. at 2663-64.
139. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (discussing that courts should presume that Congress intended
for agency deference to their interpretations but noting that “such a presumption cannot always hold” and
that courts must examine the processes taken to arrive at the decision); Mead 533 U.S. at 230-31
(examining agency actions, such as notice-and-comment making, that foster fairness and deliberation to
determine whether an agency action warrants Chevron deference); see also Neal K. Katyal, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 66, 105 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Legal
Academy] (Katyal notes that “[o]ne way of understanding Hamdan is through the lens of administrative
law.” He finds that the Court “consciously refused to award deference” to the President’s actions because

404

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:2

The touchstone of Kisor step two, therefore, should be examining executive
action to determine whether it was by informed deliberation by experts.140 Criteria
for this investigation would include whether the decision resulted from a debate
between all relevant policy and legal actors who were capable of looking beyond the
immediate political necessities of a given presidency.141 A contemporary
memorandum by a senior administration official outlining the contours and relevant
players of the debate would help demonstrate that a given action was a well-reasoned
policy and not simply a litigation position.142 Other context-specific indications of
internal debate could also be considered. For example, the State Department
maintains a dissent channel for foreign service officers to express displeasure with a
State Department’s proposed policy and warn of potential problems for them in the
field.143 Executive evidence of similar channels allowing for debate amongst experts
could also be considered. Lastly, a court could look toward whether the executive
sought to conform its actions to accepted past practices or whether it significantly
departed from precedent. Constraining action to past precedent would demonstrate
that the executive was still operating within the area of congressional approval.

3.

Kisor in Practice—an Example

An application of Kisor to Youngstown would clarify many of the hardest
cases involving executive power with which the current Youngstown and Marbury
analyses struggle to grapple. In cases where Congress clearly legislated a power to
the executive, the analysis would be decided at step one as it would indicate that the
action is permissible. However, given that most of these cases do not arise in
situations with such clear statutory background, Kisor step two would illuminate the
proper amount of deference that should be afforded to the executive’s action based
primarily on the internal decision-making process leading to the decision.
Consideration of a hypothetical example here is helpful. It is early 2022 and
the President orders a bombing of military targets within a Middle Eastern country
unrelated to the original 2001 AUMF.144 Congressional leaders are caught off guard.
“they lacked support from the bureaucracy, and in particular the Judge Advocates General and the State
Department.”).
140. Jinks & Katyal advocate for the use of similar internal executive processes as preconditions for
deference. Noting that the executive’s claims for deference stems partially from its claimed expertise, it
should only be rewarded with deference for processes that ensure expertise. For example, when agencies
adopt processes such as the State Department that allow for airing of internal dissent, the claim of expertise
is strengthened. In comparison, the growth of political appointees within the bureaucracy challenges the
reason for deference stemming from expertise. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1279-80.
141. Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 139, at 112.
142. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) (denying Chevron
deference because the interpretation seeking deference was taken for the first time during litigation).
143. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1279.
144. The AUMF provides that the “President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, . . . in order to prevent any future acts of
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While they, like the public, knew of a public feud between the two countries, they
did not think it would lead to an attack with casualties. Some in Congress call for the
rescission of the AUMF or a change to its contours. Others verbally approve the
tough stance taken by the President. No legislation is passed.
A court examining a case challenging the President’s action with these facts
would face difficulty using any of Youngstown, Dames & Moore, or Marbury analyses.
Under Youngstown as articulated by Justice Jackson, a court would likely find that
such an attack is impermissible. While the President would argue that the 2001
AUMF directly authorized the strike—allowing it to enter Zone One, or at least
invited presidential action—placing it in the Zone Two, a court faithfully applying
Justice Jackson’s analysis would likely reject these arguments. The court would likely
not find that the AUMF, authorizing force against those who participated in the
September 11 terrorist attacks, could be stretched to constitute textual support for
actions against unrelated countries over two decades after its enactment.
Additionally, as Justice Jackson articulated, the absence of a broader provision within
the AUMF to attack other countries could be viewed as Congress not leaving the
president’s powers as “an open field.”145 In comparison, a court applying the Dames
& Moore gloss onto Youngstown might reach the opposite result. A court might, for
example, look to Congress’s failure to respond to similar past presidential military
strikes as a premise for their approval.146 In fact, unlike in Youngstown, a court might
even look to the AUMF’s “general tenor” as support for the President’s actions given
that both address external threats to the country.147 A court applying a Marbury
statutory analysis approach would be left with a dearth of tools to analyze the short
AUMF to discern whether it permits a president attacking a country that had nothing
to do with the 2001 terrorist attacks but could nonetheless be considered a sponsor
of terrorism today.
Applying Kisor to discern where this action fits within the Youngstown
tripartite system would provide clarity to a court seeking it.148 The step one statutory
analysis would not yield a definitive result. While the attacked country did not

international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Authorization
for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
145. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
146. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682, n.10 (“Indeed, Congress has consistently failed to object
to this longstanding practice of claim settlement by executive agreement, even when it had an opportunity
to do so.”).
147. See id. at 678-79 (discussing that “enactment of legislation closely related to the question of
the President’s authority in a particular case. . . may be considered to invite measures on independent
presidential responsibility . . . where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here,
there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President”)
(internal citations omitted).
148. A court may seek such clarity as it navigates the existing Youngstown, Dames & Moore, and
post-9/11 precedent. A lower court in these situations face the reality of utilizing the Youngstown zones and
factoring the Dames & Moore gloss; at the same time, the court may utilize the statutory analysis evidenced
in the post-9/11 cases. Facing such precedent, Kisor offers a deference regime without abandoning the
tenets of the Youngstown zones.
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participate in the 2001 attacks, it would be difficult to categorically declare the
AUMF denies the President from taking actions to protect from future attacks,
especially since Congress has yet to vote to repeal the legislation despite its continued
use. Therefore, the level of deference would be decided under Kisor step two,
principally looking at the executive’s internal decision-making process. The executive
could point to aspects of that process such as which military and diplomatic experts
were involved in the decision or whether there was a robust and informed debate
with opportunities for dissent. Outside of looking toward whether the requisite
experts and process were used, a court could examine whether this practice falls into
a precedent of presidential action that Congress has taken no action in response to.
While this should not be the only factor, it could signal whether such actions have
been delegated through the political branch practice. Lastly, the President could
bring forward other evidence to demonstrate that the decision taken used the
appropriate level of expertise that Congress would assume that the executive would
take for such an action. Thus, the analysis would put the burden on the executive to
demonstrate that procedures were followed, but once done, would provide
predictable deference for the decision.
Ultimately, comparing how a court would utilize the different modes of
analysis illuminates two key factors. First, applying Kisor represents a functional
compromise between Youngstown and Dames & Moore. It grants the executive more
leeway than Youngstown to work outside of congressional approval to respond to the
scenario in front of it. Yet it does not grant the executive the Dames & Moore carte
blanche power to base their actions on perceived congressional intent. Second, the
burden is on the executive to demonstrate that the character and context of the
decision warrants deference, but this burden is predictable and would provide a clear
backdrop for judicial review. Therefore, this analysis returns some of the burden of
the uncertainty to the executive. Under Youngstown the burden was very much on the
executive to demonstrate that its actions fell within a congressional scheme or at least
was not foreclosed by similar legislation. In comparison, Dames & Moore turned this
analysis on its head, finding that ambiguity can support an executive’s claim. How a
court conducts a Marbury statutory approach does not allocate silence in a predictable
manner. Applying Kisor, the burden of ambiguity—and in this sense, action—falls on
the executive to demonstrate that their decision-making is worthy of deference. The
executive, however, would know that this is the case and if it desired such deference,
it could mold its processes accordingly.

III.THE BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF KISOR IN THE YOUNGSTOWN
REGIME
There are three primary advantages of importing Kisor into Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown framework. First, it provides predictable and consistent criteria to judge
congressional support for an executive’s action, and it would shape superior
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incentives for both political branches than currently exist. Second, it advocates for
judicial restraint, within reason, to allow the political branches to fulfill their
constitutional roles. Lastly, and related to both previous areas, the Kisor framework
represents a workable compromise between those that advocate for strong deference
to the executive in these areas and those that believe the courts must follow the
Marbury statutory approach. On the other hand, there are potential constitutional
and institutional drawbacks of importing Kisor into the Youngstown framework.
Constitutionally, such a regime may impede the executive’s inherent national
security and foreign affairs powers, while also inhibiting the judiciary’s role of stating
what the law is. Institutionally, additional process requirements may hinder a
president’s ability to act quickly in a crisis.

A. Benefits
1.

Predictability and Incentives

The current analysis is devoid of predictability for both the political and
judicial actors involved. For example, the Bush administration was unlikely to know
how the Court would apply the ambiguous post-9/11 statutory provisions when
crafting the policies later challenged in a series of Supreme Court cases involving
detainee rights.149 Notably, both the current methods of analyzing executive action—
statutory analysis primacy and Youngstown—suffer from similar predictability
problems. Courts relying on the statutory interpretation of a Marbury analysis face a
problem that the statutes in these fields are often limited and inherently opaque with
multiple potential sources of law and precedent, making their outcomes
unpredictable.150 Similarly, cases adjudicated under the Youngstown framework alone
lack predictability given courts’ difficulty discerning whether Congress has
acquiesced to a given action or rejected it. While Justice Jackson’s concurrence as
originally formulated, focusing on a close distillation of the congressional scheme,
would be fairly predictable, this aspect was curtailed by Dames & Moore’s emphasis
on congressional intent.151
Actors’ incentives would be better positioned under a predictable regime
compared to the current status quo. With Kisor in place, the executive would be
incentivized to undertake external and internal processes to better position itself for
the potential of later litigation. In comparison, under the status quo, or under a
149. It appears that Congress also may not have incorrectly anticipated the Court’s actions during
this time period. For example, following the string of defeats, Congress amended the MCA habeas corpus
statute to eliminate federal jurisdiction over detainees claims; instead, the review procedures in the D.C.
Circuit were contemplated to be the sole mechanism. Landau, supra note 10, at 1957-58. That said, it is
not clear how much Congress actually endorsed the President’s procedures, as they were not within a
comprehensive framework and the President advocated a reading of the DTA which appeared to contradict
the statutes’ plain text. Id. at 1958.
150. See supra Section I.B.
151. See supra Section I.A.ii.
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deferential Youngstown regime, the president is incentivized to articulate bold policies
with loose connections to the underlying statutes.152 Kisor would provide better
incentives for both political branches—the regime would prod the president to notify
Congress of upcoming action, and Congress would be unable to claim ignorance.
Under the current statutory analysis, Congress can punt difficult questions to the
executive or craft ambiguous legislation that gives the president significant and
unintentional leeway.153 Under a modern Youngstown analysis, Congress’s incentives
may be even more perverse. For example, given that the touchstone of Dames &
Moore Zone Two is congressional acquiescence and intent,154 Congress currently
benefits from using legislative history to try to bind, or at least influence, the
executive outside of bicameralism and presentment.155 Granting the executive
deference only after they followed process requirements would push the two political
branches to work together to shape policy and disincentivize Congress from using
amorphous and unclear tools like legislative history to influence the executive.

2.

Judicial Restraint

The current national security and foreign policy analysis allows for the
potential of greater judicial intervention into the political actors’ realms even as it
has also allowed for broader presidential powers. Judicial interference with President
Bush’s post-9/11 policies is what spurred the initial call for the Chevronization of
foreign affairs and national security doctrines.156 Intervention is not preordained,
however. In this field of vague statutory analysis, courts using a Marbury analysis
maintain a broad latitude to rule in whichever manner they deem proper. While the
Court used this discretion to curtail the expansive claim of power articulated by the

152. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1255 (“The President can take, under the guise of an
ambiguous legislative act, an interpretation that gives him striking new powers, have that interpretation
receive deference from the courts, and then lock the interpretation into place for the long term by
brandishing his veto power.”).
153. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 83, at 924 (“[Congress] is [] likely to respond erratically to exogenous
pressures and to punt hard questions; often, it will be simply unwise.”).
154. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79.
155. See Russell Balikian, Textualism in the “Zone of Twilight” Understanding Textualism’s Effects on
Youngstown Cases, 4 NAT. SEC. L. BR. 1, 11 (2013) (concluding the congressional debates and reports used
in Youngstown cases tend to favor Congress).
156. See Landau, supra note 10, at 1961 (“Chevron-backers, as one might expect, lament the past
decade’s lack of ‘super-strong’ deference to the Executive. Posner and Sunstein argue that ‘Hamdan [wa]s
simply wrong’ and that Justice Thomas’s dissent, which ‘relied on the principle of executive deference,
based on the President’s institutional advantages, is very much in the spirit of our argument that foreign
relations should be Chevronized.’ ”).

Winter 2021

Adding Bite to the Zone of Twilight

409

Bush administration,157 it could also use it to grant deference to the executive.158 In
short, by heavily relying on statutory analysis in this field, courts are left with
enormous opportunity to expand their authority beyond stating what the law is
because of the dearth of statutory foundation in national security and foreign policy
matters. In fact, this paucity of statutory bases is what prompted Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in the first place.159 Today, the Youngstown framework does not serve to
constrain the judiciary appropriately given its ability to consider factors like
congressional intent and acquiescence.
In comparison, Kisor analysis would limit the ability of courts to be overly
deferential or vice-versa by proscribing specific criteria to use as a basis for decision
making. This limit of judicial outcomes would allow courts to police the boundaries
of executive action vis-à-vis Congress. Using process-based approaches to police
deference in this field is also similar to how courts use Auer and Chevron to regulate
agency action without having to fully assess the nuanced technical basis for the
decisions. Additionally, it would allow courts to fulfill their constitutional duty of
saying what the law is because of Step One, which analyzes the statutory and
constitutional basis for an executive’s action. While courts may still overstep within
the framework and find the executive’s basis either clear or ambiguous, the Kisor
framework would at least make the steps taken by the court clearer and more uniform
than they currently are.

3.

Compromise

Ultimately, what may be considered the largest benefit of applying Kisor to
Youngstown’s tripartite scheme in these areas is that it represents a compromise
between competing stances. On one hand, it constrains the growth of executive
power compared to those that believe that extensive deference is warranted. On the
other hand, it is more permissive than, at least in some situations, courts using the
157. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593-94 (“The Government would have us dispense with the inquiry
that the Quirin Court undertook and find that either the AUMF or the DTA specific, overriding
authorization for the very commission that has been convened to try Hamdan. Neither of these
congressional Acts, however, expands the President’s authority to convene military commissions.”). But
see Landau, supra note 10, at 1948-49 (discussing that the President argued the Supreme Court should
defer to its security policies because of its inherent Article II powers or broad authority to read
congressional statutes broadly but the Court rejected these arguments without “making itself the center
of attention” by deciding the scope of individual rights or executive power). Therefore, Landau argues
that the Court did not craft ultimate holdings relying on individual rights or executive power and left it
to the political branches to update the underlying statutes to grant executive authority. While this is true,
the Court nonetheless curtailed the executive’s power barring new, specific legislation.
158. All one needs to do is look toward the other opinions in the post-9/11 cases, which often argued
that there was strong statutory basis for the President’s action. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 678 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“Our review of petitioner’s claims arises in the context of the President’s wartime exercise
of his Commander in Chief authority in conjunction with the complete support of Congress.”) (Emphasis
added).
159. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A judge, like an executive adviser, may
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power as they actually present themselves.”).
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Marbury approach in the areas of national security and foreign affairs. The Kisor
approach applies a more predictable framework for the two political branches to work
within. By refocusing their analysis on the compromise embodied in Youngstown
between executive deference and strict construction of the law, courts would maintain
their judicial role in declaring what the law is.

B. Drawbacks
The arguments against applying Kisor are constitutional and institutional.
On the constitutional end, this approach may encroach upon the executive’s inherent
powers in foreign affairs and national security and the judiciary’s power to interpret
statutes to say what the law is. Institutionally, focusing on statutory analysis and
process could hinder a president’s ability to react quickly in a crisis.

1.

Constitutional—Executive

Many of the critics of the post-9/11 cases found that the judiciary was
depriving the executive of their constitutional role in the country’s foreign affairs
and national security.160 Article II makes the President Commander in Chief of the
armed forces and vests the office with executive power.161 In his Hamdan dissent,
Justice Thomas utilizes these constitutional provisions and purported original
understandings to argue for vast executive power.162 To that end, for the judiciary to
curtail the executive’s ability to operate within these fields may pose a constitutional
issue.163
160. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 213 (discussing that even if Congress failed to authorize
the military commissions challenged in Hamdan, President Bush would maintain the power under Article
II to establish them).
161. See Landau, supra note 10, at 1922.
162. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The structural advantages attendant to
the Executive Branch — namely the decisiveness, ‘activity, secrecy, and dispatch’ that flow from the
Executive’s ‘unity,’ led the Founders to conclude that the ‘President ha[s] primary responsibility — along
with the necessary power — to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign
relations.”) (internal citations omitted).
163. In addition to this inherent constitutional question of impinging on the executive’s
prerogative, it could be argued that these cases raise non-judiciable political questions. For example, given
that the subject of disputes between the executive and Congress would involve “the politically sensitive
area of foreign affairs” a court may view it as being controlled by political standards. RICHARD FALLON
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 260-61 (7th ed.
2015) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)). This argument, however, would not likely
preclude a court from resolving a case on the merits. To begin, while the statutory basis for the
decisionmaking would be unclear for a court to resort to the Kisor framework, it would still be involve
interpreting a statute. See id. at 261 (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S.
221 (1986)) (discussing that a unanimous Court rejected the government’s argument that it was precluded
from reviewing a decision of the Secretary of Commerce in refusing to certify Japan’s whaling practices
inhibited an international conservation program despite the significant political overtones bearing on the
relationship between the U.S. and Japan). More recently, the Court noted that the political question
doctrine was a “narrow exception” and that the invocation of a congressional statute rendered it difficult
to establish the Baker standards of “textual commitment of the question to a coordinate branch and the
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Yet, even proponents of strong deference to the executive in these fields
acknowledge that constitutional basis for dominant executive power in these areas is
indeterminate at best.164 As Justice Jackson found, “[a] century and a half of partisan
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less
apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question” regarding
executive authority.165 For that reason, any imposition on the executive’s authority
in this area will likely only concern those that favor a very strong executive.
Additionally, the imposition would be small. An executive operating with a statutory
basis for their action could act with little fear of Kisor analysis interference. In
situations where statutory permission is less clear, a president being reviewed under
the regime could take additional steps, such as ensuring that their relevant
department heads were coordinating and opining on the action.

2.

Constitutional—Judiciary

Others would critique applying Kisor in this context for reasons similar to
critiques of Chevron and Auer in administrative law: it potentially abdicates the core
judicial role of declaring what the law is.166 The Constitution vests the “judicial
Power of the United States” in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, and a
core aspect of this judicial power is to interpret the laws and apply them.167 A
precedent directing judges to defer to the executive’s interpretations, which are far
from impartial, strikes at the core of what Article III judges do under the
Constitution.168
absence of judicially manageable standards.” Id. at 256-57 (citing Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189
(2012)); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2002) (“We are now in a
position to understand why the political question doctrine came under pressure once Baker v. Carr gave it
the form of law. Baker v. Carr made it natural to reject political question arguments by noting that only
an ordinary question of constitutional interpretation . . . should be self-monitoring in Henkin’s sense,
while skepticism about the ability of the political branches to behave in a constitutionally responsible
manner undermines the claim that any constitutional provision should be self-monitoring in the sense [he]
urged.”).
164. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1202 (“But the explicit grants of foreign relations
power to the executive are rather sparse and ambiguous.”). But see Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 14, 61 (finding
that the Constitution grants the President the exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and
government despite the dissent not supporting such a contention).
165. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35.
166. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Auer is different. It does
not limit the scope of the judicial power; instead, it seeks to co-opt the judicial power by requiring an Article
III judge to decide a case before him according to principles that he believes do not accurately reflect the
law. Under Auer, a judge is required to lay aside his independent judgment and declare affirmatively that
a regulation means what the agency says it means — and, thus, the law is what the agency says it is.”).
167. Id. at 2437 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
168. See id. at 2438-39. In addition to the general Article III concerns of applying a deference
regime in place of statutory analysis, advocating for the utilization a decision purporting to apply Auer
deference may be questioned. In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch found that Kisor represented “more a stay
of execution than a pardon” and that the “Court cannot muster even five votes to say that Auer is lawful
or wise.” Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Similar arguments were made when
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While valid, this particular concern lacks bite. In applying the Kisor
framework, judges would still determine whether the statutory basis for deference is
ambiguous using all traditional tools of statutory construction.169 To that end, a
reviewing court would still parse those executive interpretations as courts considering
regulations under Kisor must “carefully consider the text, structure, history, and
purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on.”170
Therefore, while modifying the deference regime may implicate some Article III
constitutional concerns, it would still preserve the courts’ role in properly fulfilling
their roles under the Constitution.
A related concern is the ability of the judiciary to proscribe process
requirements onto the executive.171 Some would argue that this not only aggrandizes
courts’ power but impermissibly trammels on the executive’s prerogative to operate
as they see best. But courts applying Kisor would not force the executive to respond
with process changes; they would only allow for greater deference when these
processes are used—courts would be allowing the executive to leverage their
institutional expertise to grab greater deference for themself.172 Additionally, courts
applying Kisor would be doing so for many of the same reasons that are present in
administrative law, where it has served to ensure that delegation actually occurred
and deliberative processes were followed.173

3.

Institutional

Outside of the constitutional concerns, applying the Kisor framework to
national security and foreign affairs would hinder the executive’s advantages in
flexibility and speed. Given that the executive needs to be able to react quickly and

scholars advocated for Chevron to be applied to these questions. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 68, at 810
(“It is perhaps more than a little ironic that Chevron has gained interest from foreign relations scholars at
the same time that scholars of administrative law have been demonstrating with increasing persuasiveness
how limited the impact of Chevron has been in cases reviewing agency statutory interpretation.”).
However, unlike with Chevron many of the same concerns that apply for administrative law, such as poor
incentives for the agency and separation of powers concerns, do not apply for the executive because the
executive is not promulgating an underlying regulation to be interpreted.
169. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
170. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
171. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 139, at 112 (“Brazenly advocating for a different executive
branch process could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the Court — particularly if the Court was
seen as empowering itself to measure the executive branch support of any future legal interpretation by
the President.”).
172. Id.
173. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2000) (“Congress, that is, may not have
expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap.
Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which ‘Congress did
not actually have an intent’ as to a particular result.”) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
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efficiently,174 any requirement of additional steps to assuage fears of judicial
disapproval may prove disastrous.
Again, this potential concern does not stand up. It is questionable how
much Kisor would hinder these types of actions because litigation typically ensues
over multiple months and years following a decision.175 While it is true that a
heightened judicial review compared to complete deference may lead to more
caution,176 this would be a feature and not a bug—the executive would be encouraged
to take steps to ensure expertise is embedded into the process. In fact, moments when
it is unclear whether the executive maintains authority for their actions are likely the
times when courts should be incentivizing further deliberation, such as engaging
Department heads or policy experts in conjunction with congressional committees.

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Justice Jackson’s opinion reflected an institutional process,
tying an executive’s power directly to its coordination with Congress. Yet this
framework is diluted when courts allow for criteria like legislative history and
congressional ‘tenor’ to bless a president’s action. Responding to this dilemma by
using recent administrative law precedents, which respond to similar dynamics,
would help courts ensure that a workable balance is maintained. While any
application of judicially created process raises constitutional and institutional
concerns, it appears that these are outweighed by the potential benefits of
predictability and judicial restraint. Moreover, given that the test utilizes both
statutory and institutional process components, it reflects a compromise between
various conceptions of executive power vis-à-vis the other branches.

174. See Bradley, supra note 85, at 664 (discussing foreign affairs deference decisions reliance on
the need for the executive to respond to changing and difficult situations).
175. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 84, at 1252.
176. See id. at 1252 n.82.

